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Comparing socialization, cultural and individual level effects on 
attitudes towards nuclear energy – 
A multilevel analysis of 27 European countries 
 
Sebastian Jäckle, University of Freiburg 




Despite visible cross-country variation in survey data on attitudes towards nuclear power in 
Europe, studies of nuclear risk perception have predominantly related peoples’ attitudes to 
individual level factors. To account for the variance at the country-level, multilevel regression 
analysis, allowing for the integration of both individual and aggregate level factors, is 
proposed as a more fitting tool. Our model analyzes data from a 2008 Eurobarometer Special 
Issue on attitudes to nuclear energy. Apart from socio-demographic factors, geographic 
distance to the nearest nuclear power plant, knowledge concerning nuclear issues, trust in 
official sources as well as self-placement on a political scale show influences on attitudes 
towards nuclear energy at the individual level. At a country level, dependence on foreign 
energy sources and the electricity price do not prove significant, while socio-cultural factors, 
political socialization through Green parties and a familiarity effect are particularly important. 
The results suggest that the integration of aggregate level factors may help to develop a more 
complete understanding of public perceptions and of the effects of culture and socialization on 
attitudes. 
KEYWORDS: 




The events at Fukushima Daichi in the wake of the devastating earthquake and tsunami in 
March 2011 reinforced worldwide debate on the use of nuclear energy. However, there are 
big differences in countries’ reactions. While some of the strongest came from countries not 
yet using nuclear Energy (Israel and Venezuela, for example, decided to stop the development 
of the first nuclear power plants (NPP) in their respective countries), Germany clearly stands 
out when looking at those countries that already use nuclear power. The centre-right coalition 
government that had only in October 2010 enacted an extension of the operational life spans 
of German NPP for an average of 12 years, about-faced and decided immediately to shut 
down the seven oldest plants after the Fukushima incident and to proceed with an accelerated 
phase out of the remaining ones by 2022. In other countries, the renaissance of interest in 
nuclear energy that could be observed before the accident in Japan did not decrease as 
strongly: Most nuclear power countries only announced further security checks, some in 
addition temporarily froze their ongoing nuclear energy programs or authorization procedures 
(Switzerland, China, Taiwan), while others like France, the Netherlands and Turkey declared 
that they would continue with their plans for construction of new NPP.   
These developments at the country-level are reflected by and are at the same time at least 
partially an implication of very diverse attitudes towards nuclear energy at the individual 
level. This paper focuses on these attitudes and analyzes which factors determine a positive or 
a negative stance by individuals in European countries towards atomic energy. Moreover, it is 
suggested that the cross-national variation is partially explained by effects of culture and 
socialization. Apart from questions concerning practical and technological implications as 
well as diplomatic and political consequences at the international level that a further 
expansion of nuclear energy would entail (Dhanapala, 2010; Diyakov, 2010; Goldschmidt, 
2010; McCombie & Isaacs, 2010; Potter, 2010), the increased importance of the public in the 
implementation of all kinds of energy projects (Haggett, 2011; Valentine & Sovacool, 2010; 
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Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, & Bürer, 2007) underlines the relevance of taking into account  
peoples’ perceptions when analyzing the future development of this source of energy. 
Democratic regimes depend on the goodwill of their citizens for the enforcement of large-
scale energy projects and hence must respond to peoples’ opinions on these issues. The major 
aim of this study is to test whether, apart from factors describing individuals, characteristics at 
a higher level of aggregation – in particular, at the country level – affect peoples’ attitudes 
towards nuclear power. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section surveys existing research on the topic from 
a number of different angles. This interdisciplinary view, taking into account perspectives 
from political science, sociology, psychology and geography, leads to the identification of 
several factors which potentially influence attitudes towards nuclear energy. The review of 
previous studies also reveals that perceptions of nuclear power and associated risks have 
primarily been related to personal characteristics and this individual level explanation has 
been the dominant perspective in most sociological and psychological studies (Sjöberg, 2000). 
Acknowledging the importance of individual characteristics – and thus controlling for factors 
found in present studies – we suggest that people’s perceptions are also influenced by 
contextual variables which have to be measured at a higher level of aggregation. While 
individual factors explain the within-country variation, these level-2 factors account to a 
greater extent for the differences between the countries. Considering that current research on 
the perception of nuclear power does not adequately take into account these macro variables, 
political, economic and socio-cultural factors will be tested alongside energy-specific country 
characteristics such as the number of nuclear power plants operating in a country. With 
independent variables at the individual as well as at the country level, a multilevel analysis 
serves as the appropriate statistical approach. 
The third section briefly describes the method inherent in this approach. 
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Section four presents the empirical analysis. In the first part of this section, we provide a 
descriptive cross-country overview of the two dependent variables measuring attitudes 
towards nuclear energy based on data from a Eurobarometer special issue from 2008 
(Eurobarometer, 2008): First, the general opinion towards nuclear power and second, more 
specifically, the acceptance of three regularly made statements about the potential benefits of 
atomic energy. The second part of the section gives an overview of the operationalization and 
measurement of the independent variables. The statistical analysis follows in the remainder of 
this section. It builds on individual data from the Eurobarometer study and data measured at 
the country level. In contrast to previous studies, which focus mostly on local or single 
country analysis, the use of Eurobarometer data permits a more inclusive cross-country 
comparison that gives the results a higher degree of generalization. The paper concludes with 
a summary of the main results and some recommendations for a future research agenda.   
2. EXISTING RESEARCH  
2.1. Individual level (level-1) 
Considering the research on attitudes and opinions from a psychological and sociological 
perspective, these criteria are to a large extent ascribed to characteristics of the individual. 
Studies have shown that socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, age and education 
have a strong influence on opinions in general. Particularly those attitudes connected with the 
values Ronald Inglehart associates with post modernity – among others, questions of 
economic and ecological sustainability – have been shown to be influenced strongly by these 
socio-demographic factors (de Groot & Steg, 2010; Franzen & Meyer, 2004; Inglehart, 2003; 
Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Torgler & García-Valiñas, 2007). Clearly, attitudes towards nuclear 
power – as one of the leading ecological and socially contested issues of contemporary 
society – should generally also be regarded as being influenced by such basic personal 
characteristics. Earlier studies have, indeed, identified effects for at least some of them: Men 
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mostly came out as being more in favor of nuclear power than women (Bassett, Jenkins-
Smith, & Silva, 1996; Dunlap, Kraft, & Rosa, 1993; Eurobarometer, 2010; George & 
Southwell, 1986), while the impact of age has changed throughout the history of nuclear 
power. In the 1950s, younger respondents were more positive in their acceptance of atomic 
energy than older persons, but, from the 1970s onwards, this trend reversed and the youth 
became more hostile to nuclear power (Fisher, Metzner, & Darsky, 1951; Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989). In trend terms, this is still the case, although more recent studies have 
found that differences between age groups have decreased or even vanished (Eurobarometer, 
2007, 2010; Whitfield, Rosa, Dan, & Dietz, 2009). Descriptive statistics from the 
Eurobarometer series furthermore show minor differences between education levels 
(Eurobarometer, 2007, 2010).  
A recent study conducted by Whitfield and his colleagues in the United States nevertheless 
did not find socio-demographic factors such as gender, age, education and income to be 
directly linked with the perception of nuclear power except for the fact that “nonwhites [were 
found to be] more supportive than whites”. On the basis of a structural equation model, they 
argue that values and trust are the main driving forces of opinions on nuclear energy – both 
nevertheless depend heavily, although indirectly, on socio-demographic factors (Whitfield et 
al., 2009). In contrast to the Whitfield et al. study based on its own purpose designed survey 
instrument, we can only resort to data derived from the Eurobarometer questionnaire which 
does not allow to control for values. That being so, we do expect socio-demographic factors to 
show an impact. In contrast, the Eurobarometer data does allow testing for the relevance of 
trust. Trust has emerged within the last decades as one of the most important research 
interests in the functioning of “risk societies” (Beck, 2007). It is seen as a means of reducing 
the increasing complexity and uncertainty people are facing with the growth of technical 
intricacy (Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 2000). Therefore, trust, for example in official 
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government agencies, should be of particular importance in an area as technologically 
complex as nuclear energy. Present studies confirm this (Slovic, Flynn, & Layman, 1991; 
Viklund, 2003; Whitfield et al., 2009). In conjunction with trust, knowledge is generally 
considered as a relevant factor in risk perception studies (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000; 
Viklund, 2003) – for a more critical perspective compare (Sjöberg, 2001). A higher degree of 
knowledge is seen as enabling individuals to estimate risks in a more appropriate way leading 
to lower risk perceptions in general (Slovic, 1987) and, as Viklund highlights, for nuclear 
risks in particular (Viklund, 2003). Several studies have tested the relevance of further 
individual variables: number of children, income and political position (Benedict, Bone, 
Leavel, & Rice, 1980; Eurobarometer, 2007; George & Southwell, 1986; Whitfield et al., 
2009). These will be used as controls in the following models.  
Another level-1 factor that will be tested in this article is geographic distance to a nuclear 
power plant. The rationale behind the inclusion of this variable seems at first straightforward: 
Numerous studies have shown that perceived personal risk decreases with distance from the 
source of danger. This holds true for natural disasters such as hurricanes (Lindell, Lu, & 
Prater, 2005; Peacock, Brody, & Highfield, 2005), earthquakes or floods as well as for the 
man-made hazards constituted by technological facilities (Lindell & Hwang, 2008). With 
regard to this reasoning, we would expect greater distances to the next NPP to be correlated 
with lower risk perceptions translating into a more positive attitude towards nuclear energy. 
This would correspond to a ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) mindset as studies have shown it 
for the new construction of NPP (George & Southwell, 1986). But this is only one side of the 
‘proximity-coin’. In contrast to the NIMBY syndrome, several studies have revealed that 
people are often less critical of nuclear power when they already live in the immediate 
vicinity of an operating NPP (Eiser, Pligt, & Spears, 1995; Greenberg, 2009; Melber, Nealey, 
Hammersla, & Rankin, 1977; Peters, 1980; Stagl, 1986; Venables, Pidgeon, Simmons, 
Henwood, & Parkhill, 2009). Possible explanations for this attitude include economic 
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dependence on the plant as an employer (Wynne, Waterton, & Grove-White, 2007) or some 
psychologically protective mechanism (“neighbourhood halo effect” (Bickerstaff & Walker, 
2001)) helping to justify the choice of residence. All these explanations nevertheless focus on 
people living close to a NPP, whereas this is clearly not true for the majority of respondents in 
the Eurobarometer survey. Therefore any potential geographic effects will mainly rest on 
people living at a larger distance from a NPP. The theoretical argument is different for them: 
When the next NPP is very far away, perhaps even in another country, a “fear of the 
unknown”, as it is known from psychological studies on diverse subjects, might be relevant 
and lead to a more negative attitude toward atomic power. Furthermore, as there are obvious 
age differences between NPP, which might in turn affect perceived safety, the age of the 
closest NPP is included as a control. Both directions of influence are plausible here: While the 
older a NPP, the higher is probably the risk associated with it but at the same time the 
customization of the public increases with its age which would foster a less negative attitude.  
 
2.2. Aggregate level (level-2) 
There are several potentially explanatory factors for personal perceptions that can be 
identified at the macrolevel. First, variance in attitudes toward nuclear power can be related to 
socio-cultural differences. With individuals being socialized in a specific context and with 
shared identities, beliefs and concepts providing a common framing of certain issues, a 
cultural influence on individual’s perceptions can be hypothesized (Douglas, 1992; Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982). Its relevance for the analysis of risk perceptions has been highlighted in 
previous studies (Boholm, 2003; Gierlach, Belsher, & Beutler, 2010; Oltedal, Moen, Klempe, 
& Rundmo, 2004). While the concept of culture can refer to different levels, e.g. 
organizations or regions, the national level is generally believed to be one of the most relevant 
and, in a meta-study by Karahanna and her colleagues, has been shown to be widely used in 
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research (Hofstede, 1983; Karahanna, Evaristo, & Srite, 2005; van Everdingen & Waarts, 
2003). We therefore use this level of aggregation as level-2 in the multilevel analysis.  
In applying a political science perspective on individual perceptions, a second set of variables 
can be identified. A possible explanation for the cross-country variation could be the political 
socialization of the population (Poguntke, 2002; Rihoux & Rüdig, 2006). Considering the 
case of nuclear energy, the increased salience of environmental issues within the European 
Union and especially the nuclear question, traceable since the mid-1970s (Kitschelt, 1986; 
Surrey & Huggett, 1976), led to the establishment and rise of Green parties in at least some 
countries. If a Green party has strong representation in parliament or is even part of 
government, it will be able to establish debate about nuclear power high on the political 
agenda. Thus, there are two ways of influencing public opinion: Through parliamentary or 
governmental action. For both “Green variables” endogeneity could be a problem and should 
thus be acknowledged, as their causal relationship to the nuclear attitudes variables is 
somehow unclear. Green parties could also be strong (in parliament and government) because 
of a strong anti-nuclear position within the population. Probably both effects reinforce each 
other. We nevertheless assume the political socialization effect to be a relevant and probably 
even the more important one. A final test of the causality is nevertheless not possible without 
having panel data or doing process tracing in terms of more qualitative case studies. Another 
factor on which “political socialization” will depend is the provision of information via free 
media. According to Mazur “the mass media are the primary link between active participants 
in a (technocratic) controversy and the wider public. […] Thus information flows to the public 
through a narrow channel that is regulated by a small number of activists and media people” 
(Mazur, 1984). With studies proving that those elites who represent the broadcast and print 
media generally show a rather critical stance towards nuclear energy, especially when 
compared with scientific experts (Pollock, Lilie, & Vittes, 1993; Rothman & Lichter, 1987), 
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we assume that freedom of the press enhances the spread of a more critical perspective on the 
topic.  
Furthermore, we suppose a more positive attitude towards nuclear energy in Eastern Europe. 
Two reasons can be mentioned here: 1) there has not been a similar long-lasting critical 
debate about atomic power specifically and energy issues in general within the Eastern 
European countries compared to that observable in Western Europe, and 2) during the EU 
accession negotiations, the Commission stipulated the shutdown of several reactors for 
security reasons as a prerequisite for accession (Bohunice in the Czech Republic, Ignalina in 
Lithuania, and Kozloduy in Bulgaria). The population in these countries as well as those in 
other countries dependent on electricity imports from these states reacted very negatively to 
these forced shutdowns. 
A third group of contextual variables more specifically relating to the field of energy and 
nuclear politics must also be incorporated into the model. First, the number of NPP can be 
expected to influence individual perceptions, as a higher number of plants (in relation to a 
countries’ population) should result in a higher level of familiarity with the issue and in 
perceiving nuclear power as something normal, more or less belonging to everyday life. 
Therefore, a familiarity and normality effect can be hypothesized: The more NPP are 
operating in a country per million of the population, the more positive the attitudes towards 
nuclear energy should be. Second, drawing on a rational choice perspective, factors connected 
with the consumption of energy are controlled for: On the one hand, the dependence on 
foreign energy imports, as a high dependence on foreign energy imports might stimulate 
public debates on the safeguarding of local energy supplies and therefore impact the 
acceptance of nuclear power as a possible way out of the energy dependency. On the other 
hand, the interaction between the electricity price and the share of atomic energy in a country 
is expected to have an impact. In cases when there is a high percentage of nuclear power and 
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at the same time the electricity price is high, or when both variables are low, we expect the 
people to hold a more negative stance towards nuclear energy.  
 
3. METHOD: MULTILEVEL-ANALYSIS  
While multilevel analysis has a long tradition in educational research (Burstein, 1980; 
Cronbach, 1976), this method has also proven to be suitable for the evaluation of risks as, for 
example, Poortinga has shown (Poortinga, 2005; Poortinga, Bronstering, & Lannon, Early 
View (Article first published online: 7 APR 2011); Poortinga, Cox, & Pidgeon, 2008). We, 
therefore, wish only to point out three main aspects that distinguish a multilevel model from a 
simple OLS regression and secondly focus on two methodological challenges that our specific 
research faces. For a general introduction to multilevel modelling see (Hox, 2010; T. A. 
Snijders & Bosker, 1999).  
The three main differences to OLS are: First, multilevel analysis enables us to include 
variables measuring at a higher level of aggregation such as the ones described in the last 
section to account for a cross-country variation in the attitudes towards nuclear energy; 
second, the intercepts of the individual factors are allowed to vary randomly across countries 
(random intercept model) and, third, the slopes of the individual factors can also be modeled 
as randomly varying (random slope model). This technique allows for modeling the impact of 
covariates in such a way that their influence on the dependent variable can differ across the 
groups (countries) not only in terms of the level of impact, but also in terms of the causal 
direction of this impact. In cases when there is no significant variation between the slopes, the 
slope-parameters can also be fixed to obtain a parsimonious model which is still statistically 
adequate. This flexibility represents a big advantage of multilevel models over classic OLS-
regressions, especially when a single explanation applying to all countries cannot be 
reasonably assumed. In this regard the multilevel model can be seen as an answer to critiques 
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raised from the perspective of qualitative research, asking for more context-specific 
explanations. 
The first challenge in context of this study is the number of cases which is a crucial question 
for multilevel-analysis. As Snijders highlights, the overall number of level-1 units is relevant 
for testing level-1 effects (which should not be a problem in the present analysis with almost 
26.000 individuals in the Eurobarometer sample), but if also level-2 variables are tested the 
“sample size at the highest level is the most limiting characteristic of the design”, whereas the 
average group sizes are not very important for the power of the models (T. A. B. Snijders, 
2005). Diverse rules of thumb for the minimum number of units are proposed – from 
approximately 30 to 100 (for an overview see (Braun, Seher, Tausendpfund, & Wolsing, 
2010)). Although the 27 European countries we are able to use are definitely on the lower end 
of the ‘rule of thumb scale’, other studies have shown that, even with less level-2 cases, 
meaningful multilevel analyses can be conducted (Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003; Rosar, 
2003) and, in particular, that the restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation applied in 
the present analysis produces reasonable variance estimates even with very few level-2 groups 
(Browne & Draper, 2000; Maas & Hox, 2004). Nevertheless testing a higher number of level-
2 variables might lead to a problem with the degrees of freedom (df). According to Hox with 
24-30 groups the operating alpha-level, indicating the real amount of type I errors, is at about 
9 per cent and thus higher than the nominal 5 per cent. This means that the estimated standard 
errors of the random variables probably have a small downward bias and therefore the 
significances of these estimates have to be interpreted somewhat more cautiously – the fixed 
parameters and their standard errors are accurate instead (Hox, 2010). For keeping the bias 
within reasonable limits, we have only estimated models with at least 15 degrees of freedom 
remaining for the residuals and to check the robustness of the results we applied a jackknifing 
procedure. Another necessity stemming from the small number of level-2 groups is to assume 
those slopes that are set to random to vary independently from each other.  
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The second challenge relates to the issue of centering. There has been a major debate in the 
literature whether and under which circumstances it is meaningful or even necessary to center 
the independent as well as the dependent variables before running a multilevel analysis, rather 
than simply using the raw scores. Two different ways of centering are proposed: Group mean 
and grand mean centering. Raudenbush recommends centering level-1 variables at their 
respective group means (Raudenbush, 1989). A routinely adoption of this kind of centering 
has been criticized for various reasons (Hox, 2010; Kreft, de Leeuw, & Aiken, 1995; N. T. 
Longford, 1989; N.T. Longford, 1989; Paccagnella, 2006; Plewis, 1989). All in all the 
advantages stated for group mean centering do not compensate for the problems it produces. 
Centering on the grand mean on the other hand does not have similar drawbacks. Models with 
grand mean centered independent variables are equivalent to models using raw scores, but the 
interpretation of the intercept and the level-2 intercept variance becomes meaningful in 
contrast to the raw score model where the value zero is perhaps not even possible (e.g. age). 
After centering the intercept can then be interpreted as the expected value of the dependent 
variable, when the independent variables take on their overall means (Hox, 2010). Hence the 
following analysis centers all independent level-1 variables on their grand mean except for 
dummies which all already have a meaningful zero.  
 
4. ANALYSIS 
4.1. Measurement and description of the dependent variables: Large cross-country 
variations in attitudes towards nuclear energy 
Several special issues of the Eurobarometer on nuclear energy in recent years have shown that 
questions on nuclear power generally manifest strong variation between the European 
countries. Graph 1 below depicts European perceptions about risks and benefits of atomic 
energy. We see that the vast majority of respondents have a clear stance towards nuclear 
energy – only in four countries (Romania, Malta, Ireland and Portugal), none of them 
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currently operating a NPP (Romania closed its last one in 2007) – are there more than one 
quarter of the people who see neither the risks outweighing the benefits or the other way 
round. Additionally, Europeans have very different perceptions when it comes to the risk-
benefit ratio. Especially in the Central and Eastern European countries as well as in Sweden 
and Finland, we observe a higher percentage of people that regard the advantages of atomic 
power as more relevant than the risks. In Spain, Austria and especially in Greece and Cyprus 
on the other hand only a small minority thinks this way. The pattern found here in the 2010 
special issue is also quite stable through time; there were only slight shifts compared to the 
previous Eurobarometer issue (Eurobarometer, 2007). Other questions on nuclear energy in 
general (e.g. on the security of nuclear waste management or the possibility of operating a 
NPP in a safe way) manifest a similarly large cross-country variation (Eurobarometer, 2007, 
2008, 2010). 
 
Graph 1. Perception of risks and benefits of nuclear power 
 
Source: Eurobarometer Special Issue 324, March 2010.  
 
Drawing on these descriptives, it can be concluded that variation in the perception of nuclear 












benefits outweigh risks risks outweigh benefits neither don't know
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potentially to effects of culture and socialization. To test this “socialization” claim, we 
consider two dependent variables, both stemming from a Eurobarometer special issue from 
2008, measuring two interrelated but distinct aspects of attitudes towards nuclear energy (we 
resorted to the special issue from 2008, since the most recent Eurobarometer special issue on nuclear 
energy from 2010 lacks data on a number of independent variables). The first is the general opinion 
on nuclear energy (OPINION) operationalized by the question “Are you totally in favour, 
fairly in favour, fairly opposed or totally opposed to energy production by nuclear power 
stations?” The second variable tested is a simple composite index that depicts the overall 
approval of three statements often made about the benefits of nuclear energy (BENEFITS): 1) 
nuclear energy diversifies our energy sources, 2) nuclear energy reduces the dependence on 
oil and 3) nuclear energy reduces the emissions of greenhouse gases. The OPINION question 
as well as all three BENEFITS questions measure on a four-point scale. With the arithmetic 
mean being used for the aggregation, the whole BENEFITS index also ranges from one to 
four. Graph 2 gives a first descriptive overview of the two dependent variables. In both cases 
high values indicate a negative attitude towards nuclear energy. The correlation between the 
two variables is moderately strong (r = .55) which points to the fact that the acceptance of 
pro-nuclear statements is certainly connected to the overall opinion about nuclear energy, but 
further factors seem to be relevant for this more general attitude as well. Thus the 
BENEFITS-variable can be regarded as a specific sub-component of the OPINION-variable. 
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Graph 2: Means and standard deviations of the OPINION- and BENEFITS-variables 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer Special Issue 297, June 2008. 
 
The considerable observed cross-country variation in average attitudes towards nuclear 
energy strongly suggests that individual perceptions may be subject to contextual factors at 
higher levels of aggregation and, most importantly here, at the national level. This calls for a 
more inclusive analysis beyond the individual level, testing for the relevance of the factors 
described in section 2.2. To test whether a multilevel analysis is really needed from a 
statistical point of view – i.e. to determine whether the variation across the level-2 groups is 
so big that it has to be explicitly accounted for – the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) 
can be calculated (Hox, 2010). The ICC is defined as the “between-groups effect divided by 
the total effect, for the null model” (Garson, 2010) specifying the percentage of the variance 
of the dependent variable that can be attributed to differences between the level-2 groups. 
With a resulting ICC of .209 for the OPINION variable and .158 for BENEFITS, about 21 
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(BENEFITS 16) per cent of the total variance can be attributed to differences between the 
nations, while about 79 (BENEFITS 84) per cent are due to within-group characteristics. 
Although the ICC shows that individual characteristics are probably the most important 
factors in explaining opinions on nuclear energy, there is a significant part of the variance 
which they cannot explain. According to Hox, the ICC levels observed here clearly 
necessitate multilevel analysis to examine existing variation in a statistically adequate way 
(Hox, 2010).  
 
4.2. Measurement of independent variables 
For most of the independent factors described in section 2, the operationalization and 
measurement are straightforward. Table A1 in the Appendix gives an overview of all 
variables, their coding, their construction and their sources. Some of them nevertheless 
deserve some short comments.  
We used three dummy variables to determine, if a person lives in a rural area, in a small town 
or a large city. According to Inglehart the diffusion of post-materialist values is closely 
connected to urbanization which should foster a more critical stance towards nuclear energy 
in cities than in rural areas.  
For testing the relevance of trust two operationalizations are used: First, the trust in official 
(pro nuclear) sources (government, national agencies, nuclear industry) which should have a 
positive influence on the attitudes toward atomic power and, second, the trust in more 
alternative sources of information (NGO, international organizations working on peaceful 
uses of nuclear power, media) which could be connected with a more negative stance towards 
nuclear energy. Knowledge is also measured in two different ways: First, real knowledge is 
measured by a cumulative index taking on higher values if respondents answer 12 knowledge 
based questions on nuclear issues asked in the Eurobarometer survey correctly and, second, 
the self-assessment of their knowledge on this topic. High real and self-perceived knowledge 
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should according to theory have a positive impact on the attitudes towards nuclear power. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the knowledge index varies by country between 0.4 and 0.85 (mean = 
0.6) indicating no perfect but at least a satisfactory internal consistency. The alphas for both 
trust indices are lower (varying by country between 0.15 and 0.65), nevertheless as 
Cronbach’s Alpha heavily depends on the number of items (Carmines & Zeller, 1979) and 
both scales only consist of three items, these results can also be regarded as sufficient.  
For testing the effect of having children the Eurobarometer question measuring the number of 
children until age 14 living in the household was recoded as a dummy variable. Counting only 
children until 14 could nevertheless be a too narrow operationalization for representing the 
family structure. Therefore, two further variables are tested: First, a simple dummy variable 
where the respondent lives singly, and, second, household size, which can be seen as a proxy 
for the number of children as well as for a more traditional family structure. The 
Eurobarometer does not ask for income. Hence, a prosperity index was constructed measuring 
the overall material well-being of respondents. Ideological position is measured via the 
respondent’s political left-right self-placement.  
The measurement of geographic distance to the next NPP proves to be more complex: As 
operationalization the distance ‘as the crow flies’ was chosen. Two approximations are 
necessary for the calculation: Since we do not know the respondent’s exact place of residence, 
the center of the region where she lives (asked in the Eurobarometer) is used – thus 
geographic distance differs insofar from the other level-1 variables as it can only vary 
between regions, but not in between individuals from one region. The regions are in general 
based on the NUTS2 standard. The coordinates of the center of the region are derived from 
Google Maps and those of the NPP stem from the reactor database of the World Nuclear 
Association (http://world-nuclear.org/NuclearDatabase/Default.aspx?id=27232). For the 
actual calculation, we assume the earth to be a sphere which enables us to use the formula of 
the great circle to determine those distances.  
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For the characteristics of the 27 European countries - our level 2 factors - the following 
operationalizations were used. To measure the impact of national culture on individual 
perception, we decided to draw on the works of Geert Hofstede. He defines culture as “the 
collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or 
category of people from another” (Hofstede, 1998), traceable in differing values, attitudes and 
beliefs. This definition allows for the inclusion of the national level as a unit of comparison 
since for some of these values “the nationality component is relatively strong” (Hofstede, 
1998). Hofstede distinguishes five cultural dimensions: Power Distance measures the extent 
to which less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that 
power is distributed unequally. Individualism describes the extent to which people in a society 
are integrated into groups. Masculinity refers to the distribution of values between the 
genders. Uncertainty Avoidance indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to 
feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Finally short-term vs. 
long-term orientation distinguishes between societies fostering pragmatic virtues oriented 
towards future rewards versus virtues related to the past and present. It has been shown to be 
well suited for the comparison of the European countries from a cultural perspective (Kolman, 
Noorderhaven, & Hofstede, 2003). Data was obtained from Hofstede’s website 
(http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx.).   
We argue that varying acceptance of nuclear power can be partially attributed to different 
national cultures drawing on two of the five dimensions. First of all, uncertainty avoidance, 
can be expected to have an impact. Since the risks and benefits of nuclear power cannot be 
assessed precisely from the lay perspective, individual perceptions involve a certain level of 
uncertainty. The lower the societal tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty, the higher the 
probability of a more reluctant position towards nuclear energy should be. Second, national 
differences in the long-term and short-term orientation of individuals can have an impact on 
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the perception of nuclear energy. As Hofstede suggests, short-term oriented societies tend to 
promote thinking in absolute terms, for example, the dichotomy of bad vs. evil, while long-
term oriented societies foster the consideration of circumstances in such judgments. In 
addition, long-term orientation may result in a higher valuation of pragmatism.(Hofstede, 
Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010) In the context of nuclear power, we would expect long-term 
oriented societies to have a more positive perception of nuclear energy, based on a pragmatic 
as well as possibly more differentiated and not as a priori fixed perspective as short-term 
oriented societies exhibit. 
For testing the impact of political socialization via Green parties and the media, three 
variables are used: One measuring the average seat share of Green parties in national 
parliaments between 1997 and 2007 (based on annual data), a second one measuring the 
percentage of time during the same period that a Green party was part of the government and 
the third variable measures the average freedom of the press between 1997 and 2007 using 
data from the freedom of the press index by Freedom House. We expect to find a more 
negative public perception in ‘greener’ countries and in those countries with a freer press.  
The last variable that needs further explanation is the index combining the share of nuclear 
power (S) and the electricity price (P). This PS-index takes on high values either if there is a 
high percentage of nuclear power and the electricity price is high or if both variables are low. 
In both cases we expect people to hold a negative stance towards nuclear energy. Table I 
shows the constructional logic of the index: 
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Table I: The constructional logic of the PS-index and the expected influence on the opinions 
about nuclear energy 
  electricity price (P) 
  low high 
share of nuclear energy (S) 
low anti 
 (high PS-index) 
pro 
 (low PS-index) 




anti = negative attitude towards nuclear energy expected; pro = positive attitude towards nuclear energy 
expected. Explanatory note: For the calculation of the index: 1) the median of both variables (price and nuclear 
share) is subtracted from the empirical values, 2) the resulting values are standardized on an equal scale [-1, +1], 
3) these rescaled values are multiplied and 4) the absolute values are taken and multiplied by 100 to achieve 
better interpretable coefficients.  
 
 
4.3. Model building 
The previous section showed how to measure the proposed explanatory factors. This section 
tests their influence on the two dependent variables OPINION and BENEFITS estimating 
multilevel regressions. Model building for both dependent variables followed four steps from 
which only the last ones are presented in table II (all models not presented here (also all 
jackknife models) are available from the authors). First an empty model was estimated (a 
model that only contains the dependent variable and the level-2 grouping variable, but no 
further independent variables); it is needed for the calculation of the ICC and as a reference 
for the more sophisticated models. In the second step, we estimated random intercept models 
including all individual factors suggested in chapter 2.1 as well as all level-2 variables 
described in section 2.2. The third step was to find a more parsimonious model. Therefore we 
dropped all the individual as well as aggregate variables that did not significantly improve the 
estimation. The final models presented in table II furthermore estimate random slopes for 
those level-1 variables where the slopes show significant variation across countries as 
indicated by a likelihood ratio chi square test (for a visualization compare Graph 3 which 
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illustrates the extremely diverse slope parameters for the variable ‘age’ in the BENEFITS 
model). According to Snijders and Bosker (1999), the amount of explained variation can be 
estimated separately for the two levels. Thus every model includes one R2 for the micro-level 
(i.e. variation explained by individual characteristics) and one for the macro-level (i.e. 
variation explained by cultural and socialization effects on the country level). 
 








































Table II: Multilevel regression results for OPINION and BENEFITS  
 





OPINION dependent variable 
Level-1       
Sex -0.238*** (0.0283) -0.167*** (0.0151) -0.147*** (0.0219) 
Age -0.00168** (0.000634) -0.00191** (0.000621) -0.0000804 (0.000449) 
Household size 0.00701 (0.00498) 0.0112*** (0.00340) 0.00576 (0.00442) 
Single -0.0405* (0.0170)   -0.0115 (0.0151) 
Age at end of education -0.00925** (0.00299) -0.00386*** (0.00102) -0.00403 (0.00221) 
Prosperity index -0.0156*** (0.00224) -0.0142*** (0.00179) -0.00784*** (0.00199) 
Children dummy 0.0415* (0.0171)   0.0225 (0.0151) 
Self assessment nuclear 
knowledge 
-0.147*** (0.00665) -0.110*** (0.00540) -0.0879*** (0.00596) 
Knowledge nuclear energy -0.0263*** (0.00449) -0.0406*** (0.00521) -0.00608 (0.00418) 
Trust in official sources -0.0809*** (0.0114) -0.0655*** (0.00835) -0.0433*** (0.00891) 
Trust in alternative sources 0.0124* (0.00624) -0.0197* (0.00862) 0.0246*** (0.00555) 
Left-right selfplacement -0.0275** (0.00998) -0.0147** (0.00516) -0.0190** (0.00723) 
Distance next NPP (log) 0.0372*** (0.00993) -0.0145 (0.00796) 0.0451*** (0.00885) 
Age next active NPP 0.00184* (0.000768)   0.00170* (0.000684) 
Community size: rural 
(dummy) 
  0.0322** (0.0108)   
Community size: small town 
(dummy) 
  0.0186 (0.0106)   
Benefits     0.557*** (0.0262) 
Level-2       
Intercept level-2 0.0950*** (0.0286) 0.0402*** (0.0124) 0.209*** (0.0641) 
Seat share Greens 0.0349 (0.0199) 0.0278* (0.0131) 0.0177 (0.0298) 
Long-term vs. short-term 
orientation 
-0.00918* (0.00391) -0.00495 (0.00256) -0.00892 (0.00585) 
Reactors per population -0.478** (0.170) -0.231* (0.113) -0.650* (0.253) 
Uncertainty avoidance   0.00325 (0.00170)   
Random effects       
𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2 (level-1) 3.318*** (0.216) 2.211*** (0.191) 2.194*** (0.323) 
Tu0 (level-2) 0.627*** (0.00553) 0.414*** (0.00365) 0.495*** (0.00436) 
Tu1 (sex) 0.0187*** (0.00597) 0.00422*** (0.00168) 0.0105*** (0.00356) 
Tu2 (age) 0.00000692*** (0.00000258) 0.00000854*** (0.00000281) 0.00000236*** (0.00000117) 
Tu3 (age at end of 
education) 
0.000180*** (0.0000640)   0.0000840*** (0.0000345) 
Tu4 (children dummy) 0.00177*** (0.00152)   0.00132*** (0.00114) 
Tu5 (knowledge nuclear) 0.000388*** (0.000146) 0.000629*** (0.000205) 0.000347*** (0.000128) 
Tu6 (trust official sources) 0.00230*** (0.000962) 0.00107*** (0.000510) 0.00118*** (0.000569) 
Tu7 (left-right selfplacement) 0.00249*** (0.000741) 0.000595*** (0.000198) 0.00126*** (0.000389) 
Tu8 (trust alternative 
sources) 
  0.00128*** (0.000560)   
























Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
4.4. Interpretation of the models 
We first discuss the results based on the random slope model 1 in table II with OPINION as 
dependent variable. Variables like for example the community size dummies which did not 
show significant effects in the first-steps of the modeling process as well as those displaying 
certain collinearities, notably reducing the significance of the level-2 variables, were dropped. 
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The resulting, more parsimonious final models presented here show no relevant 
multicollinearity any more (highest VIF for all three models = 1.88). Hence and because of 
the significant reduction in the variance components that can be observed when compared to 
the empty models, they can be seen as the best fitting models for explaining the variance in 
attitudes towards nuclear energy. The coefficients are not standardized, thus they correspond 
to the effect on the dependent variable of a one point increase in the respective independent 
variable. Keeping in mind the coding and the 4-point scale of the dependent variable (high 
values indicating a negative attitude towards nuclear energy) the results for level-1 can be 
summarized as follows:  
Men are more positive about nuclear energy than women. Under ceteris paribus conditions, 
men have an OPINION value that is 0.24 points lower than the one for women, which is more 
than 8 per cent of the whole scale. Additionally older people, singles, persons with a lower 
degree of education and people who are less wealthy as measured by the prosperity index are 
also more positive towards nuclear energy. In contrast, having children does not appear to 
have a similar strong impact, although this may well be a consequence of  the 
operationalisation chosen, counting children only until the age of 14. However, the alternative 
operationalization in terms of household size that additionally can be seen as some proxy for a 
more traditional family structure shows no significant impact. When included without the 
other operationalization both variables (children dummy and household size) show a strong 
and significant effect.   
As expected, perceived as well as the real knowledge of nuclear issues has a negative 
coefficient and thus a positive impact on the attitude towards nuclear power. These effects are 
also stronger than the socio-demographic ones: Someone who attests herself as having a very 
good knowledge has an OPINION score that is about 0.44 points lower than someone who 
describes herself as being not at all informed on nuclear energy issues. The effect of the real 
knowledge is a bit weaker: Those who answer all knowledge based questions correctly have 
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an OPINION score that is about 0.32 points lower than someone who has all answers wrong. 
As earlier studies have shown, trust also plays a relevant role: Those who say that they trust 
governments, national agencies and the nuclear industry have an OPINION score that is about 
0.24 points lower than people who do not trust any of these actors. An opposite but much 
weaker and less significant effect can be found for trust in alternative sources. Political self-
placement is another level-1 variable that shows a significant and relatively strong influence: 
Every point more towards the right on the 10-point left-right scale a respondent places herself 
means a reduction of about 0.03 points in the OPINION variable.  
Geographic distance to the next active NPP is the last strongly significant effect at the 
individual level for the OPINION variable. As expected, an increase of this distance results in 
a more negative attitude towards nuclear energy; an effect that is not due to the probably very 
few Eurobarometer respondents living in the immediate vicinity of a NPP (for them an 
opposite effect could be expected according to the existing research), but to those living far 
away. This effect could be termed a ‘fear of the unknown’ as people in countries like Malta 
and Cyprus are not exposed to nuclear energy issues at all, which results in their very extreme 
positions. In accordance with the argument that it is more the large distance towards the next 
nuclear power plant that matters, the minor and only weakly significant effect of the age of 
the next NPP (as a proxy for it’s perceived safety) becomes reasonable. The direction of the 
coefficient would speak for a higher risk perception of older NPP, but this effect is very weak 
– if the next active NPP is 40 years old this would only increase the OPINION score by 0.055 
compared to the case that the next active plant is 10 years old. This effect should be stronger 
in an analysis that focuses on regions, where there are some NPP in the surrounding area, as 
for example the extensive protests from nearby German communities against the oldest 
French NPP at Fessenheim particularly show.  
The R2 for the micro level indicates that the individual factors tested in the model explain 
about 17 per cent of the variance in the OPINION variable located at the individual level. At 
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the macro level we find a higher explanatory power: 49 per cent of the level-2 variance can be 
explained by the country variables. 
In concordance with the influence of political ideology on the individual level, we also 
expected a similar political socialization effect for the Green parties on level-2 and this 
expectation is, at least on the 0.1 level of significance, confirmed by the models. The average 
seat share of Green parties during the period 1997-2007 is a good explanatory factor for the 
level-2 variance. Given high multicollinearity between seatshare and government 
participation it is not possible to test both factors simultaneously. When government 
participation is controlled for without including seatshare, the effect is very much the same 
but slightly weaker than for seatshare. The interpretation of the level-2 coefficients is the 
same as for level-1: An increase of one percentage point for the seat share of Green parties 
within parliament means a plus of nearly 0.035 points on the OPINION score. Yet, as 
jackknife tests show, this effect is not as robust as others, leading to the conclusion that the 
effect of Green parties does not have the same relevance in all 27 European countries (while 
the Austrian Green party seems to make a difference, the Finnish Green party does not). Of 
course there are countries where no relevant Green parties exist, as in the case of Denmark. 
The Danish example points to a potential pitfall of the analysis with respect to Green parties. 
A Green and especially an anti-nuclear power agenda can also be pursued by parties not 
primarily coded as Green parties. The Danish social democrats and especially the far left 
Enhedslisten for example captured traditional green issues, resulting in the absence of a strong 
Green party in Denmark. In Germany in contrast, the cleavage between ecological and 
economic or industrial issues which emerged during the 1960s and 1970s was not internalized 
by the established parties, leading to the emergence of a strong Green party. Additionally, 
even among those parties coded as Green, we see a certain variation in attitudes towards 
nuclear energy. While the issue of nuclear power serves as the major point of identification 
for the Green party in Germany, in Latvia, for example, the Green party has its origins in the 
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agricultural milieu, where issues of nuclear power are far less important. These examples 
show that a more thorough inspection of the positions of all parties with regards to nuclear 
power is advisable when the effect of political socialization should be analyzed more 
precisely.  All other variables – for OPINION as well as for BENEFITS – are robust in the 
jackknife models, indicating that the small number of level-2 groups does not pose a serious 
problem. Yet, the finding that political socialization can make a difference in the attitudes of 
the population is encouraging for Europe’s Green parties as it stands in contrast to previous 
research that found only a weak societal impact of Green parties in government (Poguntke, 
2002). In contrast, a political socialization effect via free press is not discernable. This result 
must nevertheless be qualified. As press freedom is heavily correlated with, among other 
things, the seat share of Green parties – which is why it is excluded from the final models – its 
genuine effect on attitudes to nuclear energy is hard to trace. When included without the 
multicollinear variables, its direction is as expected: People in countries that do not have free 
media are more positive towards nuclear energy, while press freedom seems to promote a 
more critical perspective on nuclear power.   
When controlling for further factors, the dummy variable for Eastern European countries does 
not show a significant effect. Hence, and because other variables explain the differences 
between the countries in a more meaningful way than this simple dichotomy, the Eastern 
Europe dummy is not included in the final models.   
Two of the factors potentially also explaining differences between Western Europe and the 
Eastern part of the continent are the socio-cultural variables uncertainty avoidance and long-
term vs. short-term orientation derived from Hofstede. While uncertainty avoidance does not 
show a significant effect, long-term orientation does – although it is not very strong. The 
effect is in line with our expectations. People who live in societies that show a stronger long-
term orientation hold a significantly more positive stance towards nuclear energy than those 
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with a short-term orientation. The assumption that a more pragmatic and less a priori fixed 
perspective on nuclear energy fosters a more positive perception thus seems to be valid. 
The last group of level-2 variables tested shows diverse effects. While the number of NPP 
standardized on a country’s population is highly significant – in countries where a high 
number of NPP are operating we find a positive attitude towards nuclear energy, indicating 
that people become familiar with this source of energy and its associated risks – the two 
remaining more rational choice variables, which control for dependence on external energy 
supply as well as the interaction between electricity price and nuclear share (PS-Index), show 
no large nor significant effects and are thus omitted from the final model.     
 
Looking at model 2 with the second dependent variable, which depicts the overall approval of 
three statements often made about the benefits of nuclear energy, we observe some 
differences to the OPINION model, but in general the results are very similar. Also the R2 for 
the micro and macro level do not change much. The BENEFITS variable can therefore be 
seen as a good cross-check for the first operationalization. Some of the discrepancies are 
nonetheless worthy of note: While no effects for the respondent’s community size could be 
observed in the OPINION models, according to the BENEFITS model those living in rural 
areas are significantly more likely to agree with pro-nuclear statements than people living in 
larger towns. While this result could be plausible in light of the information/education divide 
between urban and rural areas, the negative coefficient for the ‘trust in alternative sources’ 
variable is puzzling, especially when compared with the OPINION model where we observed 
a significant positive coefficient. It means that people who trust the media, NGOs and 
international organizations working on peaceful uses of nuclear technology can identify 
themselves with pro-nuclear statements. One possible explanation is that particularly those 
people who do not trust anyone when it comes to nuclear power – and there are approximately 
14 per cent in the sample after all – are those who are reluctant to agree with the BENEFITS 
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statements. This indicates that the ‘alternative sources’ are, at least in the view of many 
respondents, often not as alternative as we originally believed. The even more negative 
coefficient for ‘trust in official sources’ confirms this view. The other level-1 variables 
correspond largely with the OPINION model.  
At level-2 we observe an influence of both Hofstede’s socio-cultural factors, however only at 
the 0.1-level of significance. As hypothesized, people living in countries that have a weak 
tolerance for uncertainty disagree to a larger extent with the three pro-nuclear statements and 
the assumed effect of long-term vs. short-term orientation is affirmed as well. 
The political socialization effect of Green parties in parliament and the familiarity and 
normality effect of the number of NPP operating in a country are both significant and as 
expected, although the latter is weaker than in the OPINION model.   
A short excursion, taking the example of age in the BENEFITS model, will explain the 
interpretation of the random effects (for age: Tu2): For the average country we predict a 
decrease of  0.00191 in the BENEFITS score for every further year of the respondent’s age. A 
95 per cent confidence interval for the country slopes can be estimated as 0.00191 ±
1.96 √0.0000854 = −0.00764 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 0.00382. Thus, assuming a normal distribution, we 
expect the middle 95% of countries to have a slope between these two values (Leckie, 2008). 
These results, showing that there are most likely positive and negative slopes for the variable 
age, confirm the picture in graph 3 which came to the same conclusion, although not 
controlling for the other individual variables. The graph already showed that while in some 
countries like Austria or Portugal becoming older is connected with a more negative attitude 
towards nuclear energy, in those countries where the population is in general more positive, 
the effect of aging is the other way round. This result could only be obtained due to the 
flexibility of the multilevel approach which allows testing different effects of covariates 
within different countries.     
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The third model in table II again explains the OPINION variable. It differs from model 1 only 
as it includes additionally the BENEFITS variable as an explanatory factor. As could be 
expected already from the significant bivariate correlation between OPINION and BENEFITS 
the latter shows a strong and significant effect on OPINION and accordingly the explanatory 
power of the model raises, while most other independent variables lose significance.    
 
5. CONCLUSION   
The major assumption of this paper is that beyond individual factors that have a long history 
in the field of attitude research, contextual factors – and effects of culture and socialization 
more specifically – measuring at a higher level of aggregation also play a role in determining 
attitudes towards nuclear power. This assumption is strongly supported by our analysis. 
Although the majority of the variance in the attitudes towards nuclear power (measured by the 
two dependent variables OPINION and BENEFITS from a 2008 Eurobarometer special issue) 
is contingent on individual factors, between 16 and 21 per cent of the overall variance is due 
to country differences. In contrast to existing studies, the multilevel regression analysis 
applied in this paper is first able to test individual as well as country-factors to account for 
both variances and second it also generates results that can be better generalized within the 
European context compared to existing studies mostly applying a single country design. 
Nevertheless it also has to be stressed that the correlations found in this analysis have to be 
interpreted with caution when it comes to causal explanations. We tried to make the possible 
underlying causality plausible, but further especially qualitative case studies are of avail to 
confirm our results. Six main results of this paper should be reemphasized.  
First, the proposed model contributes significantly to the explanation of attitudes towards 
nuclear power within the European Union. Considering the respective R², it represents a well 
fitting model. Particularly the explained variance on level-2 between the countries (R2[macro] = 
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0.52 for OPINION; and 0.56 for BENEFITS) is remarkable when compared with previous 
research that neglected the country level completely. Hence including country variables adds 
a significant proportion to the explanation of the attitudes towards nuclear power. 
Second, beyond confirming the impact of most socio-demographic variables, the models 
especially indicate that a good real or self-perceived knowledge concerning nuclear issues as 
well as trust in the information given by official sources significantly increases the positive 
perception of nuclear energy.  
Third, the use of geographic data, more specifically, the distance between the respondent’s 
region and the next active NPP, resulted in the identification of a ‘fear of the unknown’ effect: 
The larger the distance, the more critical the attitude towards nuclear energy. Although having 
the same consequences, this anti-nuclear effect should be viewed separately from those pro-
nuclear effects that have been previously shown for people living in the vicinity of a NPP. 
Our analysis suggests that two different causal logics are at work here: one fostering pro 
nuclear attitudes in the immediate vicinity of a NPP through economic dependence, 
customization or a psychological halo effect and the other one fostering anti-nuclear attitudes 
in those areas where people are not at all exposed to nuclear energy and thus exhibit a “fear of 
the unknown”. However, given the proxy character of how the distance measure was 
calculated, further research on the question of spatial influence on perceptions is clearly 
required.  
Fourth, the strength of Green parties showed significant impact. In countries where a Green 
party is strong within the national parliament, people are much more critical of nuclear power 
than in countries where Green parties are not relevant within the party system. This suggests 
that political socialization via agenda setting by Green parties through parliamentary (or 
governmental) action is possible and that it influences people’s attitudes, although as 
jackknife test show, this effect differs widely among countries. While political socialisation 
has not been considered extensively in previous studies on (risk) perceptions, our results 
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relativize findings from political science studies which show only a weak influence of green 
parties in power on policies. However, especially here we must acknowledge the potential 
problem of endogeneity calling for a cautious interpretation of the results.     
Fifth, while those level-2 variables associated with a more rational-choice perspective 
(dependence on foreign energy imports, interaction between electricity price and the nuclear 
share) do not show significant effects, the positive impact of the number of NPP operating in 
a country indicates a familiarity or normality effect.  
Sixth, we found some influence of socio-cultural factors. In societies that have a high 
tolerance for uncertainty respondents at least in the BENEFITS model were more positive 
towards nuclear power. Furthermore people living in societies with a strong long-term 
orientation are more positive than those from short-term oriented countries. This is probably 
due to the more pragmatic and less a priori fixed perspective they employ on nuclear energy. 
That result could also be an explanation for the changes in attitudes toward nuclear power 
which were detected by surveys conducted after the Fukushima disaster (IPSOS, 2011; Jones, 
2011). Particularly in long-term oriented societies these shifts would be expected. This finding 
may lend support to the necessity to include cultural aspects in the study of risk – an issue that 
has been considered extensively between proponents of cultural theory and the psychometric 
approach.    
Apart from the specific results regarding attitudes towards nuclear power, a more general 
recommendation arises from this work. The proposed multilevel methodology in combination 
with cross-national survey data (e.g. Eurobarometer, World Value Survey) has proven to be 
suited for this research topic as it explains parts of the variance that were previously neglected 
and as it generates more robust as well as results better generalizable to the population under 
research than single case/country studies. Moreover, classical psychological survey studies 
which certainly have some advantages over a secondary data analysis like the one conducted 
in this paper – especially when it comes to the identification of the impact of individual 
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characteristics – could merit from an inclusion of macro level factors. Yet the theoretical and 
methodological approach taken here is not only appropriate for analyzing perceptions of 
nuclear power, but seems equally applicable to other kinds of perceptions of risk. Hence 
taking level-2 variables like cultural framings or political socialization (they do not 
necessarily have to be located on the country-level) seriously could help painting a more 
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Table A I: Variables used in the empirical analysis 
 
Variable Coding & construction Source 
Dependent variables 
OPINION 25:   totally in favor 
50:   fairly in favor 
75:   fairly opposed 
100: totally opposed  
to energy production by nuclear power 
(don’t knows were set to the country specific mean) 
Special EB 297 
v152 
BENEFITS Composite index (arithmetic mean) for the approval of the 
following three statements about nuclear energy: 
- nuclear energy diversifies our energy sources,  
- nuclear energy reduces the dependence on oil 
- nuclear energy reduces the emissions of greenhouse 
gases 
25:   totally agree 
50:   tend to agree 
75:   tend to disagree 
100: totally disagree 
Special EB 297 
v154, v155, v156 
Level-1 
Sex 1: male 
0: female 
Special EB 297 
v389 
Age Age of respondent Special EB 297 
v390 
Household size Number of household members 
1: one member 
6: six members 
7: seven or more members 
Special EB 297 
v403 
Children  Are there children age 1 to 14 living in household?  
1: yes 
0: no 
Special EB 297 
v398, v400 
Age at end of 
education 
Age when completed full time education  
(as a proxy for the educational level; “still studying” were set to 
18) 
Special EB 297 
v387 
Single 1: single 
0: everything else 
Special EB 297 
v386 
Type of community 
dummies 
rural (1/0) 
small town (1/0) 
large town (1/0; reference category) 
Special EB 297 
v395 
Prosperity index Possession of consumer goods (proxy for economic well-
being) 
Calculation based on the availability of the following goods for 
the respondent:  
television + dvd-player + cd-player + pc + internet access + 
2*car + 3*house)  
(range 0-10) 






(don’t knows were set to the country specific mean) 
Special EB 297 
v383 
Distance next NPP 
(log) 
Distance between  regions center where the respondent is 
living and nearest active NPP 
Own calculation based on: 






Age next NPP Age of the next active NPP (in years) IAEA Power Reactor 





1: not at all informed 
4: very well informed 





about nuclear waste 
Composite index 
Consisting of 12 knowledge based questions that can be 
either wrong (0) or right (1) answered. (For example: Is high 
level radioactive waste produced only in nuclear reactors?) 
(range: 0-12) Higher values indicate better knowledge of 
nuclear waste (proxy for nuclear energy in general) 
Special EB 297 
v157 – v168  
Trust in official 
sources  
Composite index 
trust in information about the way radioactive waste is 
managed from official sources  
- trust in government 0/1 
- trust in national agencies 0/1 
- trust in nuclear industry 0/1 
 (range: 0-3) Higher values indicate higher trust 
Special EB 297 
v172, v173, v 178  
Trust in alternative 
sources 
Composite index 
trust in information about the way radioactive waste is 
managed from alternative sources  
- trust in NGOs 0/1 
- trust in international organizations working on 0/1 
peaceful uses of nuclear technology 
- trust in the media 0/1 
(range: 0-3) Higher values indicate higher trust 
Special EB 297 
v179, v176, v174 
Level-2 
Seatshare green Average seatshare of Green parties in national parliament 
between 01.01.1997-12.31.2007 (in per cent) 
http://dev.parlgov.org/data/ 
Cabinet green Average government participation of green parties between 





Societal tolerance for uncertainty 
(empirical range: 23-112 ) higher values indicate weaker 






Societal temporal orientation  






population (in Mio.) 
Number of reactors in relation to population http://prisweb.iaea.org/ 
Press freedom Degree of free media (empirical range: 9 – 42) lower values 




Energy imports per 
capita 
Net imports of primary energy (imports minus exports), in 1000 





PS-Index Index capturing the interaction between electricity price (P) 
and the share of nuclear energy (S) 
P: Price for a kWh electricity for an average household (2500-
5000 kWh), all taxes included, in EURO (2007 second half, 
Italy first half 2008) 
S: (gross nuclear production self-producers & public 







UN Stats - Energy Yearbook 
(several issues) 
 
